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This  paper  analyses  the  fundamentals  of  the  Portuguese  crisis.  The  financial  crisis  of  2007 
worsened and triggered the current Portuguese crisis. We argue that the main problem that the 
economy is facing is its output stagnation due to a kind of Dutch disease that has created high and 
increasing levels of indebtedness, low and decreasing levels of saving and has reduced Portuguese 
competitiveness. Moreover, the existence of a dualist labour market and a new vague of emigration 
reproduces inefficiency increasing unemployment of younger workers and the supply of human 
capital abroad funded by the Portuguese taxpayers. Governance problems such as bad public budget 
governance, lack of transparency and accountability are also at stake and have to be solved to allow 
the economy to return to its long-run growth path.   
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The scope of automatic stabilization is too narrow in the face of a severe recession preceded 
by a long period of sluggish growth, O’Hara (2011). The elasticity of government receipts with 
respect to GDP is usually greater than that elasticity of government expenditures. So, in times of an 
economic recession the automatic deficit tends to increase through government receipts reduction. 
More aggressive fiscal policies aimed to overcome a severe recession were conductive to greater 
deficits  through  government  expenditures  increases  but  their  efficacy  remains  controversial 
Auerbach, Gale and Harris (2010). This was the case mainly for the USA when compared with that 
of  European  countries  during  2007  crisis.  The  USA  developed  more  ambitious  help  plans, 
nevertheless for the G20 the budget deficit was 1% of GDP in 2007 and 9% in 2009. High values of 
budget deficits led to a never seen growth of public debt. This growth that most probably has acted 
as a stability buffer for financial institutions was this time not free of uncommon risks when these 
institutions were looking for safer assets. Debt accumulation and its downgrading put financial 
institutions out of the obliged ratios for assets and liabilities, creating a link of causality from state 
solvency problems to private institutions.  Portuguese financial institutions are facing that problem. 
At the same time, the trade-off between consolidation and stabilization was destroyed for most of 
the countries in favor of consolidation producing recession episodes, Barrios, Langedijk and Pench 
(2010).  
  The main issue faced by Ireland (Gurdgiev, et al. (2011)) during the financial crisis was the   2 
bailing out of Anglo Irish and Irish Nationwide Building Society, which pushed the budget deficit 
to around 38.5% of GDP in 2010, and it led to an expected sharp rise in public debt from 65.8% of 
GDP in 2009 to around 126% of GDP in 2011. As for the Portuguese and Greece (Kouretas and 
Vlamis (2010)) cases the problem was not the bailing out of financial institutions. In Portugal the 
recent crisis clearly showed problems at two banks that fall in common-criminal law, which were 
not a consequence of the financial crisis. 
At  May  3
rd,  2011,  it  was  announced  the  total  bailout  out  of  78  billions  Euros  for  the 
Portuguese economy. This was the result of negotiations between the Portuguese government with 
the IMF, European Commission and the European Central Bank following the request  for financial 
aid made by the Portuguese government to the European Commission (EC) on April 6, 2011. As a 
consequence of the bail out, the Portuguese deficit target is 5.9% of GDP  in 2011, and not 4.6% as 
it was previously agreed with the EC. For the next two years it will be 4.5% and 3% in 2012 and 
2013, respectively. Portugal is the third economy asking for financial aid in the Euro area. The 
program was approved by the European Finance Ministers on May 16, 2011. The IMF will lend at 
3.25% a total of €26 billions and the remaining €52 billions will be lent by the European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism and European Financial Stabilisation Fund at an average interest rate of 
5.7%.  
In this paper we explain the reasons why Portugal has fallen in this calamitous situation. 
Several factors led to different problems though intertwined that were conductive to this situation. 
The first problem is the sluggish Portuguese output growth. This problem was due mostly to the 
lack  of  structural  reforms,  namely  in  the  labour  market,  low  levels  of  human  capital  of  the 
Portuguese labour force, and the negative impact of globalization that suffered our economy from 
EU eastern enlargement and China accession to WTO since 2001. The second problem is the result 
of monetary integration associated with bad policies.  The decrease of interest rates after years of 
inflation uncertainty and high nominal interest rates have created a kind of Dutch disease. The 
degree of public and private indebtedness reached very high levels, the saving rate experienced a 
decrease  and  a  dangerous  negative  trend  and  price  competitiveness  deteriorated  continuously 
reducing the rate of output growth. The third problem is the lack of accountability and transparency 
of political governance.  
  Based on that framework it is perfectly comprehensible the continuous downgrading of the 
Portuguese sovereign debt made by rating agencies. Those decisions have had implications in the 
devaluation of banking assets creating a need of capital strengthening forcing most of the banks to 
sell participations in other financial and non-financial institutions. Our analysis is consistent with 
that of the IMF: “The program is built on three strong pillars. First, a set of pro-growth measures 
aimed at making the country competitive again and creating jobs--especially for the young people 
of Portugal. Second, a set of ambitious fiscal measures needed to reduce the public debt and deficit, 
implemented at a pace that is realistic and which allows Portugal the time it needs to demonstrate 
policy implementation and restore market confidence. Third, a set of measures aimed at ensuring 
the stability of Portugal’s financial sector.” Strauss-Kahn and Rehn (2011). The paper is paper is 
organized in eight sections, besides introduction and the conclusion. In the first, “A Brief History of 
Portuguese Financial Distress” is presented; next we questioned the “Portuguese Government Size” 
which is followed by the inspection of “The Portuguese Output Stagnation; in the fourth section we 
analyse  main  impacts  of  the  Portuguese  “European  Integration”;  the  problem  of  “Saving  and 
Indebtedness in the Portuguese Economy” was envisaged afterwards; “External Competitiveness of 
Portuguese  Economy”  is  the  topic  handled  in  the  sixth  section  and  is  followed  by  a  brief 
characterisation of “Labour Market and Unemployment Behaviour” and finally, in the eight section 
issues concerning Portuguese “Bad Governance: the problem of off-budgeting practice matters” are 
envisaged.       
   
1. A Brief History of Portuguese Financial Distress  
The Portuguese maritime expansion was so badly managed by the Portuguese King, like Spain with 
Filipe the Second, that in 1560 (Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)), 60   3 
years  after  the  arrival  to  Brazil,  Portugal  made  default  of  external  debts  with  other  European 
countries in the sense used by the authors of default followed by rescheduling. From 1828 to 1852, 
five episodes express the vulnerability of the Kingdom's Treasury. In April 1890, Argentina stops 
payments  to  creditors  and  Baring  Brothers  became  insolvent  in  November  1890.  The  Baring 
Brothers was an important source of financing to the Portuguese government. With the Brazilian 
crisis  between  January  and  April  of  that  year,  and  the  persistence  of  public  budgets  deficits, 
currency reserves fall by a half and in May the Portuguese experience of gold standard ended 
(1854-1891),  Santos (2001) and Duarte and Andrade (2011). In 1892 the Portuguese government 
stops payments and the rescheduling of debts came to an end in 1902. Only 1/3 of total debts were 
paid,  Mata  and Valério  (1994),  in  the  twenties  of  the  XXth  century,  external  financing  of  the 
government was closed, and the  last payment associated with this operation was made in 2001. A 
period of financial instability has characterized the post-war period 1917-1926 with many bank 
failures. After this period (and until now) the Portuguese economy has not experienced any bank 
failure. From 1945 to 2007 and in a set of sixty-six countries only Austria, Belgium, Portugal and 
the Netherlands have escaped banking crises. Even in 1960 when the war in Angola starts and also 
in 1974 with the Portuguese Revolution there were no signs of bank-run. 
From 1926 to 1974, the dictatorial regime that ruled Portugal, segregated the country at the 
international level. Portugal was admitted to the United Nations only in December 14, 1955 and 
became a member of the IMF since March 29, 1961. After the declaration of George Marshall at 
June 5, 1947 the Portuguese government decided not to participate in the Marshall aid, the so-called 
Economic  Recovery  Program,  Rollo  (1994).  Portugal  participated  only  in  the  creation  of  the 
Organization for European Economic Co-operation but in September 27, 1948, the Prime Minister 
Salazar was obliged to demand economic and financial aid from the Marshall Plan. International 
reserves saw a decrease of 42% from 1946 to 1948, and they were 60% of GNP in 1946 and only 
34% in 1948
1, (Banco_de_Portugal  (1949)  and INE (1959)).  As a consequence  the Portuguese 
economy had not benefited from the major part of funds. Nevertheless from 1949 to 1951 were 
received in Portugal 70 millions of dollars. Public infrastructure and industrialization benefitted 
from those funds.  
In 1960, Portugal faced again an external problem due to a shortage of international reserves 
but the development of the Portuguese tourism sector and emigrants’ remittances, especially from 
France, solved that problem. After the Carnation Revolution (April 25, 1974), Portugal requested 
assistance from the IMF (1977/78) ,  IMF (2011), to solve a urgent problem of public and external 
deficits,  associated    with  other  serious  macroeconomic  imbalances  such  as  sharp  increases  in 
unemployment,  pressure from oil prices and a huge inflationary pressure. The first credit tranche 
arrived in 1977 and the second in 1978. IMF financial help ascended to €111 million at current 
exchange rate. A second financial aid was requested by Portugal to the IMF in 1983. One again, 
nothing new occurred, the same known problems emerged: high public and external deficits. The 
total financing this time was €555 million. Despite the recognized success of these two aid plans 
(for the first see Schmitt (1981)) external conditions of the Portuguese economy evolved in such a 
virtuous way that the Portuguese authorities did not need to meet the accorded programs in terms of 
the agreed instruments. 
2. Portuguese Government Size  
Are average government indicators pointing out to a Portuguese macroeconomic situation 
that would evolve to a sovereign debt default?  
Table 1. gives information about government size (ratio of expenditures over GDP%) for 
European  Union  with  27  members,  Euro  area  with  12  members,  that  are  representatives  of  a 
stronger fiscal policy discipline, and Germany and France, the two major members of the Euro area, 
and the three countries under fiscal and debt stress, Ireland, Greece and Portugal. The ratio of total 
expenditure  of  general  government  over  GDP  gives  information  about  government  size.  The 
                                                 
1 We owe this observation to Professor Manuel Jacinto Nunes.   4 
general government sector comprises central government, state government, local government, and 
social security funds. 
 
 
Table 1. Ratio of expenditures to GDP (%) 
  Germany  France  Ireland  Greece  Portugal  E27  Euro12 
1988-90  43.8  49.3  44.5  41.5  37.0     
1995-97  50.8  54.3  39.0  44.9  41.6  50.1  51.0 
2002-04  47.9  53.0  33.4  45.1  43.6  46.9  47.7 
2008-10  46.0  55.1  53.0  50.7  48.4  49.4  49.6 
Source: AMECO and UTAO (2011) and authors’ calculation 
 
  Two main conclusions can be drawn from Table 1 above.  Portugal and Greece are the 
countries for which expenditure has been never reduced for the chosen periods and Portugal has a 
level of expenditure less than the average of E27 and Euro12 and near the value of Germany. Based 
on this indicator it's difficult to find out an excessive size for Portuguese Government . 
  Since February 1992 the future members of the European Monetary Union knew the general 
conditions  about  deficit  and  debt  values.  Table  2.  below  exhibits  the  occurrences  of  excessive 
deficit and positive budget balance for  Euro12, Germany, France, Ireland, Greece and Portugal 
haven't limit before the current crisis,  from 1995 to 2007. 
 
Table 2. Occurrences of Excessive Deficit and Positive Budget Balance  
  Excessive Deficit  Positive Budget Balance 
EU12  (3) 1995-1996 and 2003  2000 
Germany  (6) 1995-1996, 2002-2005  2000 
France  (6) 1995-1997, 2002-2204   
Ireland  (0)  1997-2001, 2003-2007 
Greece  (13) 1995-2007   
Portugal  (9) 1995-1998, 2001, 2003-2006   
Source: AMECO and UTAO and authors’ calculation 
 
  A positive balance was registered in 2000 for Euro12 and Germany. For 1997-2001 and 
2003-2007, Ireland has registered successive positive budget balances. Germany and France had 6 
times deficits greater that 3%. The Euro Area is an example of moral hazard creation by its leaders. 
The assumed Euro authority in these countries is very weak in historical and moral terms (see also 
Prokopijević  (2010)).  In  Germany  the  Constitutional  amend  introduced  in  2009  will  impose 
structural budget balances equilibrium at the Federal level in 2016 and at the Länders level in 2020, 
Federal Ministry of Finance (2009) and Feld and Baskaran (2010). 
  Very high values for public debt, doubling the limit of 60% for many countries, influenced 
the recent turmoil in sovereign financial market. At the end of 2010 (UTAO (2011)), the highest 
level was registered by Greece (142.8%) followed by Italy (119%), Ireland (96.2%) and Belgium 
(96.8%)  and  Portugal  (93%).  The  value for  the  Euro  area  at  17  was  85.1%,  meaning  that  the 
Portuguese value is higher but not very far from the average of this area. Notice that Ireland was 
reducing its level of public debt from 1987 to 2007. 
  The problem with the Portuguese economy is neither about average values indicators nor 
about  a long  term view of  fiscal  sustainability. Marinheiro (2006) has confirmed sustainability 
using  the  conventional  unit  root  and  co-integration  analysis.  But  the  problem  at  stake  for  the 
Portuguese economy should not be identified with a kind of long term decision by capital markets 
based on past data. Instead it should be envisaged as a situation of lending rupture created by 
forward expectations. The same comment applies to the “rule” of the 90% threshold value of debt: 
being less does not affect growth but greater will have negative implications, Checherita and Rother 
(2010) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). We will try to explain why the Portuguese economy is in a 
situation of rupture and why the financial aid is a necessity.    5 
 
3. The Portuguese output stagnation  
  In order to understand the Portuguese output path we analyse the evolution of the output in 
terms of growth rates and actual levels for 1960-2010. Considering these two variables we get a 
more  accurate  understanding  of  the  evolution  of  the  economy.  The  Portuguese  economy 
experienced in the past growth rates that are typically of emergent economies. For the period 1969-
73, the GDP average growth was 8.2% (Table 3).  
 
Table 3. GDP Growth Rates (%) 
1960-64   5.8 
1969-73  8.2 
1986-90  6.6 
1994-98  3.8 
2001-10  0.5 
2006-10  0.3 
        Source: Ameco and authors’ calculation 
 
  In the first years of the European integration (1986-90) the growth rate attained 6.6%, a 
result in accordance to growth predictions of real convergence since Portuguese real income was 
only  a  percentage  of  the  real  income  of  the  EU12  economy  Duarte  and  Simões  (2002).  But 
Portuguese divergence from EU started in 2001 since growth became anaemic during the last nine 
years.  The  growth  trend rate for the Portuguese  Economy was computed  using the  H-P  filter 
(λ =100) as illustrated in Figure 1. below.  














Source: Ameco and authors’ calculation. 
 
  To obtain H-P trend values we have used λ =100 to a new series increased 4 periods by an 
ARIMA model chosen by the Schwarz criteria. The picture of the Portuguese growth rate decline is 
very clear. The exception is for the first years following the European integration. The last phase of 
decline starts in 1999.  
  But the beginning of this last phase doesn't coincide with the above one if we take the GDP 
trend (in logs and with a λ =100, Figure 2.). 
 
 















       Souce: Ameco and authors’ calculation 
 
  In the figure above output stagnation clearly starts in 2002. Table 4. expresses the actual 
stagnation of the Portuguese economy.  
 
Table 4. Trend Growth Rates 
  Trend Growth Rate 
1998-00  2.65 
2002-04  1.56 
2008-10  1.04 
Source: Ameco and authors’ calculation 
 
  The evidence of output stagnation since 2002 has pushed our analysis further in order to 
forecast the output trend gap for 2010. Due to the atypical GDP behavior in the period following the 
Carnation Revolution, we have forecasted the values of GDP trend (H-P) based on 1978 to 2001 for 
the years 2002 to 2010. The model used for this projection, with trend GDP in logs, includes a 
constant, a time trend and the lagged value of the dependent variable. The AR1 model allows us to 
take into account the inertia of output trend evolution. We used the Ki (2009) procedure for R that 
applies the bias correction of Shaman and Stine (1988) caused by auto-regressive estimations and 
the correction of Kilian (1998) for the confidence intervals of the forecast, for which were made 
1000 bootstrap iterations, to obtain 90% confidence intervals.  
  The new series for the GDP trend augmented with trend forecast for 2002-2010 (A) and the 
two series compared (B) are in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. GDP Trend Correction (A) & (B)   7 
Time













Time Plot and Prediction Intervals
red = prediction quantiles; blue = point forecasts  
GDP-HP Portugal, actual and corrected (2002-2010)
Time














Source: Ameco and authors’ calculation 
    The existence of sluggish growth is now perfectly obvious (Figure 3. (B)). Roubini (2011) 
recognises the dependence from growth for the success of the stabilisation program of  May 4.  For 
him the lack of growth of the Portuguese economy is the most important problem that the country is 
faced with. 
The usual way of trend calculation hides a grim reality for Portugal what can be seen in the 
values of output gap (Table 5.). 
Table 5. Output gap values in % 
  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Gap  -0.19  1.16  0.20  -3.43  -3.30 
GapC  -8.58  -9.26  -12.26  -17.90  -19.66 
Source: Ameco and authors’ calculation 
  By the usual calculation, the negative gap is inexistent in 2008 (0.2%) but by our calculation 
the gap is 12%. And in 2010 the value is near 20%. This gives a black picture of the Portuguese 
economy that also has consequences at the level of the budget deficit corrected by output cyclical 
fluctuations. This applies to the correction based on H-P filter and also based on the production 
function because this last method depends essentially on that filter in input calculations (European 
Community (1995) and D'Auria, et al. (2010) in the European Union). If we don’t correct the trend 
in terms of using two trends, an effective one and a desired one the indicators of fiscal policy can be 
very misleading. Using only the first one we are prone to advise restrictive discretionary fiscal 
policies while the economy has already substantial positive budget balances, after the correction of 
cyclical fluctuations by the second (desired) trend. 
 
4. European Integration: inflation convergence and the Dutch disease 
The inflation convergence was necessary for the Portuguese euro-area membership. After 
Carnation Revolution we experienced a process of high and unstable inflation (see Figure 4.). For 
1984-85 the average rate of inflation, measured by the CPI, was 21,76%, in 1990-91, it was 11,56 
and  2.59% in 1999-2000. So the Portuguese inflation convergence process occurred at a fast speed.  
From 1977 to 1990 the Portuguese Central Bank (Banco of Portugal) applied a policy of bank credit 
rationing with a crawling-peg exchange rate policy. In the last years  of that reform (1990) there 
were too much exceptions to the target level of banking credit and it was also recognised the need   8 
to have interest rates and credit reflecting market conditions. So in 1991 the Banco of Portugal 
started a policy of targeting the value of the exchange rate of the Deutsche Mark, what it was 
equivalent  to  a  policy  of  real  evaluation  of  the  Portuguese  Escudo  to  control  and  reduce  the 
inflation rate. This is a policy that presents potential long-run drawbacks that can hamper growth in 
the future. Rebelo and Vegh (1995) shows that this kind of policy is more efficient in the short run 
than the conventional monetary policy to the control of inflation but has real greater costs in the 
long run resulting from the lost of price competitiveness.   
 








 1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000
1973:1 - 2002:4  
Source: INE (Portuguese National Statistical Institute) 
 
  In order to estimate the uncertainty associated with the evolution of inflation we used an 
AR(1) model with an ARCH(2) structure of errors estimated by maximum-likelihood. Any GARCH 
structure  tested  was  rejected.  The  model  is  indicated  below  and  has  3  equations:  equation  (1) 
models the autoregressive for the inflation rate (π ), equation (2) models the error term, where  ε 
has was a normal distribution (0,1), and equation (3) models conditional variance. 
(1)  0 1 1 · t t t π β β π µ − = + +  






· t j t j
j
σ α α µ −
=
= +∑  
 
Table 6. ML-ARCH(2) 1971:2-2010:4 (T = 159) 
D4LIPC  Coefficient  std. error  Z  p-value 
  Constant       0.00167751     0.00116407      1.441    0.1496  
  D4LIPC_1    0.942320       0.0125731      74.95     0.0000*** 
  alpha(0)    6.32146e-05    1.51812e-05     4.164    3.13e-05*** 
  alpha(1)    0.384639       0.137367        2.800    0.0051*** 
  alpha(2)    0.615361       0.147744        4.165    3.11e-05*** 
Log-likelihood       442.7605    
Likelihood ratio test for (G)ARCH terms:  Chi-square(2) = 85.5511 [2.64738e-19] 
 
  The  estimated  model  (Table  6.)  allows  us  to  calculate  the  conditional  variance  and  to 
analyse what happened in terms of uncertainty (Figure 2). 
 

















Source: INE and authors’ calculation based on model (1)-(3) 
   
As we can see (Figure 5.), we can split uncertainty path into two periods: from 1970 to 1990 
and from 1990 to 2010. This evolution is interpreted in terms of monetary policy change and credit 
market operations. The interest rates begin to decrease in a persistent way (Figure 6) after that year. 
The consequences were obvious: a huge real growth of monetary aggregates, the real annual growth 
rate of M1 from 1997:1 to 1999:4 was between 10.4% and 18.3%. Notice also that never in the past 
Portuguese individuals and firms had known such low values for the interest rates. 
 







 1990  1995  2000  2005  2010
%
1990:1 - 2010:4  
Source: Banco de Portugal, Boletim Estatístico. 
 
  Nominal interest rates were divided by 4 and real interest rates by 5 in 10 years (Table 7.). 
This was a sudden change, and no one, individual or firm, could resist to it.  
 
Table 7. Short run interest rates (quarterly averages) 
Years  Nominal (%)  Real (%) 
1990 - 1991  23.1  10.3 
1995 - 1996  12.1  8.2 
1999 - 2000  5.3  2.6 
2000 - 2001  5.8  2.1 
Source: Banco de Portugal, Boletim Estatístico. Authors’ calculation 
 
  As  mentioned before, Portuguese inflation convergence towards the level  of that  of the 
European  countries  group  with  the  lowest  inflation  was  the  result  of  a  real  exchange  rate   10 
appreciation policy. At the same time the process of financial integration had also an enormous 
impact on Portuguese macroeconomic disequilibrium’s. At December 1992 financial transfers with 
the EU were totally liberalized by the initiative of Braga de Macedo, the Finance Minister. Current 
account exchange rate transfers were allowed for Europe only in 1964. Liberalization of capital 
movements,  access  to  a  massive  market  supply  of  funds,  in  a  context  of  decreasing  inflation 
expectations and reduced inflation uncertainty, resulted into an impressive reduction of interest 
rates, a sustainable decrease of domestic savings and into a continuous increase of internal and 
external indebtedness. This situation has originated a kind of Dutch disease. 
  The concept of Dutch disease was created in The_Economist (1977) and the seminal papers 
are  two:  Corden  and  Neary  (1982)  and  Corden  (1984).  Meanwhile,  other  sources  have  been 
envisaged to explain the so called disease:  external remittances Edsel (2010), international aid 
Rajan and Subramanian ( 2011) and Verbeke (2007) and the phenomena of real exchange rate 
appreciation Adam (2005) and UNCTAD_(South_Centre) (2007). In what concerns Portuguese net 
transfers from EU, they reached 2.6% of GDP in 1996-99 and they decreased ever since : to 1.5% in 
2004-07  and  1.3%  in  2008-10.  This  aid  was  applied  mostly  in  infrastructure  investments.  A 
majority of papers supports the idea that public investment has a positive effect on long-run output, 
Aschauer (1989) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993). However the estimated effect is often small or 
negligible and too much dependent on the methodologies employed Turrini (2004)). Afonso and 
St.Aubyn (2008) have concluded for the period 1960-2005, that Portuguese public investment has 
not a crowding out effect on private investment but at best the effect is not different from null in 
terms of 95% confidence intervals. And its total rate of return is negative for Portugal (as well as for 
Austria, Finland, Greece and Sweden).  We can conclude that the policy of real exchange rate 
appreciation, EU structural funds and an impressive reduction of interest rates, all these together 
were major sources of the Portuguese Dutch disease that explain its spread that manifested mainly 
into an accruing indebtedness and lack of external competitiveness of the Portuguese economy. 
 
5. Saving and indebtedness in the Portuguese economy 
  The intertemporal constraint of individuals and firms was very much relieved. With a rate of 
interest increasingly lower than the rate of time preference, why would individuals continue to 
save? 
  When we compare the saving rate (the ratio of National Saving to GDP) of Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal, since 1990 until 2008 we see that Ireland has maintained reasonable values of savings 
while Greece and Portugal after 1994 have reduced continually their savings (Bação and Duarte 
(2011)).  
 












        Source: Ameco and authors’ calculation 
 
As it can be observed (Table 8.) the low level of savings for Greece and Portugal represent a 
clear indication that future problems to debt payments might occur, most probably.    11 
 
Tabel 8. National Saving ratio of GDP 
S/Y (%)  Greece  Ireland  Portugal 
1973-73  33.4 20.9 29.4
1989-90  17.9 16.2 22.7
2009-10  2.9 10.9 8.7
Source: Ameco and authors’ calculation 
 
  The  low  value  of  savings  is  the  other  side  of  the  Portuguese  external  current  account 
disequilibrium. It is clear that for Portugal we have also a twin's deficit problematic (Feldstein 
(1999)) with adverse effects on real exchange rate that affect both external competitiveness and 
growth of the Portuguese economy. 
  The  low  value  of  Portuguese  savings  was  considered  normal  in  the  earlier  years  of  its 
integration in EU,  it was the consequence of a process of capital integration in a more developed 
area (Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002)) but some time later, it was taken as an indicator of a serious 
external imbalance (Blanchard (2007)). 
  The level of debts in the Portuguese economy has grown without any relation with the 
growth of output or incomes. Real growth rates (deflated by GDP implicit price level) and the ratios 
of indebtedness for general government, financial and non-financial corporation and households 
and assets of the rest of the world (RW) are shown in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Total liabilities of Portuguese institutional agents and RW Assets (%) 
  ST  LT  TOTAL  ST/Y  LT/Y  Total/Y  ST  LT  TOTAL  ST/Y  LT/Y  Total/Y 
1996  2.9  10.7  8.0  52.7  101.6  154.3  -4.9  9.1  6.2  6.4  26.9  33.2 
1997  0.5  42.3  29.9  50.8  148.5  199.3  -10.7  33.3  26.3  5.5  36.0  41.4 
1998  9.2  12.7  11.8  53.0  160.6  213.6  13.6  16.0  15.7  6.0  40.2  46.1 
1999  14.9  8.1  9.8  59.1  167.2  226.4  29.3  14.4  16.4  7.7  44.5  52.2 
2000  7.1  10.7  9.8  61.1  179.1  240.2  5.4  18.3  16.5  7.8  51.5  59.3 
2001  5.9  10.4  9.2  63.6  194.8  258.4  39.4  22.6  25.0  11.3  63.3  74.7 
2002  -1.7  6.5  4.6  62.0  206.5  268.6  9.0  14.1  13.3  12.3  72.3  84.7 
2003  6.6  4.4  4.9  66.9  217.8  284.7  11.5  7.3  7.9  14.0  78.5  92.5 
2004  6.4  0.8  2.1  70.2  216.2  286.4  27.7  -4.2  1.3  18.1  74.2  92.3 
2005  1.4  5.6  4.6  70.7  227.0  297.7  11.1  8.9  9.4  20.1  80.5  100.6 
2006  -5.3  7.0  4.2  66.1  240.0  306.1  -14.8  8.6  4.3  17.1  86.5  103.6 
2007  4.8  8.3  7.6  67.7  254.8  322.5  6.6  9.6  9.1  17.8  92.9  110.8 
2008  7.5  6.5  6.7  73.0  271.8  344.8  6.4  8.7  8.3  19.0  101.3  120.3 
2009  1.8  8.5  7.1  76.2  303.7  379.9  12.6  12.5  12.5  22.1  117.8  140.0 
2010  -3.1  2.0  1.0  73.0  306.1  379.1  -14.0  -3.7  -5.3  19.0  112.1  131.2 
1995-07  4.4  10.6  8.9        10.3  13.2  12.6       
Source: Boletim Estatístico, Banco de Portugal. Financial Accounts. Authors’ calculation. ST: short term securities 
other than shares excluding derivatives + financial derivatives + short term loans + trade credit and advances. LT: long 
term securities other than shares excluding derivatives + long term loans. The first two columns are real growth rates. 
The GDP implicit price index was used to deflate the nominal series. 
    
  The average annual growth rate of total debt for the period 1995-2007 was almost 9%. 
However this situation is far from the situation of Mexico in 1994-95, East Asia in 1997-98 and 
Russia and Brazil in 1998-99, Dadush, Dasgupta and Ratha (2000) and McCauley and Zukunft 
(2008) since short-term assets of the Rest of World were only 19% in 2010, last columns, (see also 
Essaadi, Jouini and Khallouli (2009)). 
  The growth of total long-term debts is 2.5 greater than that of short-term and in levels, long-
term debt is more than 4 times the level of short-term debt. Even in 2008-2010 debts growth in the 
Portuguese  economy  was  considerable.  The  last  column  shows  the  fragility  of  the  Portuguese 
economy; from 1996 to 2010 the level of indebtedness was multiplied by 2.5. This indebtedness 
growth is incompatible with the sluggish evolution of the economy (see section 3). 
  The ratio to GDP of total debt from abroad has grown  4 times from 1996 to 2010 and the 
average real growth of debt from 1997 to 2001 was 20%. In Table 10. presents debt securities by by 
sources of institutional debtors. The Government is the most important debtor even if its position 
has been decreasing since 2005. The most recent reduction, for 2010, is naturally due to increasing   12 
difficulties to sell securities abroad and also to of-budgets expenditures (see below). Actually it is 
difficult to say what has really happened: the debts of the financial institutions reflect the growing 
need for funds to buy public debt and a not negligible part of other residents’ debt are debt of public 
firms or guaranteed by the State. 
 
Table 10. International investment position: institutional debtors of securities 
  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
General Government  70.9  79.8  80.9  80.7  71.4  70.1  71.3 
Other Monetary Financial Institutions  26.8  17.8  14.5  16.3  20.2  16.3  13.7 
Other Resident Sectors  2.3  2.4  4.6  3.1  8.3  13.6  15.0 
  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
General Government  74.4  78.3  75.5  68.1  64.9  60.0  58.3 
Other Monetary Financial Institutions  10.7  1.7  0.4  14.8  20.8  27.4  26.0 
Other Resident Sectors  14.9  20.0  24.1  17.1  14.4  12.6  15.7 
  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Boletim Estatístico, Banco de Portugal, Balance of Payments Accounts. 
 
6. External Competitiveness of the Portuguese economy 
In  the second half of 1980, Pierre  Bérégovoy,  French finance minister  and  later  primer 
minister, advocated the idea of competitive disinflation Lordon (1998) and Boissieu and Pisani-
Ferry (1995). It was recognized that with irrevocably fixed exchange rates an economy would be 
more competitive if its inflation rate was lower than that of its competitors. That idea has never 
been considered by Portuguese policy makers. Figure 8. express what happened in terms of implicit 
prices, dividing the Portuguese series by the German series (A), and in terms of the real effective 
exchange rate (B). 
 
Figure 8. Relative implicit prices and real effective exchange rate for Portugal Vs Germany 



























Source: Ameco. Real effective exchange rates, based on unit labour costs (total economy) :- Performance relative to the 
rest of the former EU-15, double export weights and authors’ calculation 
 
  The implicit price level of Portuguese GDP measured in Euros has an increasing trend in 
relation to German implicit prices. This evolution of relative prices is an incentive to imports and a 
disincentive to exports. This same evolution is confirmed by the evolution of the real exchange rate. 
From 1986 to 2010 the Portuguese implicit real effective exchange rate suffered a real appreciation 
of 100% in terms of Germany values. And from 2000 to 2010 the appreciation was also high, 20%. 
This  last  result  was  also  confirmed  in  Alexandre,  et  al.  (2009)  How  can  an  economy  with  a 
technological level that is far from the technological leaders resists to this evolution? The obvious   13 
consequence  of  this  loss  of  external  competitiveness  was  the  external  current  balance 
disequilibrium and also the low level of savings and a sluggish output evolution.  
“Portugal’s share in the world exports, particularly in goods, has substantially shrunk since 
the early nineties; also, compared to 1990, unlike the majority of the other EU member states, the 
ratio of exports of goods and services to GDP was reduced, and in 2005, well below EU averages” 
(p.53) Silva (2008). Even if  “exports of goods are shifting from low to medium (low and high) 
technology products; traditionally uncompetitive products of textiles, clothing and footwear have 
significantly lost weight in the total” Silva (2008) (p.53). For Amaral (2006), Portugal in the second 
half of the nineties has suffered from the greatest negative shock in peacetime resulting from the 
emergence of countries such as China and India and the EU membership of Eastern European 
countries. In the absence of structural transformations Portugal (like Italy) was very vulnerable to 
those competitors, “Italy and Portugal entered EMU with industrial structures that placed them 
directly in China’s line of fire.”, Ahearne and Pisani-Ferry (2006), p.4.  In this international setting 
of free movement of goods, the worst that could happen at the national level was a real exchange 
rate appreciation, and indeed it occurred.  
 
7. Labour market and unemployment behaviour 
  Perhaps the best way to characterize the Portuguese labour market is to consider it as an 
apartheid situation, Eatwell (2010). The definition in CEU (2011) suits very well to Portugal labour 
market, “large differences in relative levels of employment protection legislation contributes to a 
division between well-protected workers with permanent contracts and less-protected workers with 
atypical, mostly temporary, contracts. The impact of the crisis has highlighted this issue: job losses 
for  workers  in  temporary  work  were  almost  four  times  higher  than  for  those  in  permanent 
employment.” (p.11) 
  During the last years the Portuguese labour market has experienced a  downward trend of 
the  OECD EPL index  (Employment  Protection Legislation) like some others economies  in the 
European Union. In 2008 the Labour Code was revised and some measures were taken in order to 
facilitate its application by reducing procedural court processes, increasing trial periods and also 
reducing notice time and compensation for no-fault dismissal (OECD (2010)). The effects of these 
changes coincided with unemployment rate increase so the results of these changes have to be 
analyzed with caution.  
   
Table 11. Unemployment rate for several countries 
  2000  2010 
EU – 27  8.7  9.6 
Euro Area  8.5  10.1 
Ireland  4.2  13.7 
Greece  11.2  12.6 
Spain  11.1  20.1 
Portugal  4.0  11.0 
Austria  3.6  4.4 
U.S.A.  4.0  9.6 
   Source: Eurostat 
  The worst situations in terms of unemployment rate increases are reckoned by Portugal and 
Ireland,  (Table  11).  The  unemployment  rate  from  2000  to  2010  was  multiplied  by  3.  The 
unemployment rate for Austria is in 2010 the value of that rate in 2000 for Portugal and Ireland. 
  Historically, the unemployment rate in Portugal is not very different from that of the USA, 
but two differences are hidden in those numbers  Blanchard  and  Portugal  (2001). The duration of 
unemployment in Portugal is three times that of the USA and the relative flow of workers into 
unemployment in the USA is three times that of Portuguese workers. 
  In Figure 9. (A) and (B) we present total unemployment rate and the unemployment rate for 
workers with less than 25 years old (A) and the logs of the actual number of unemployed and the   14 
unemployed by at least 25 months (B). 
 
































Source: INE. In (B) we have logs of workers in thousands. 
   
Unemployment rate path exhibits three main characteristics: its increase after 2002 (A) with 
the youth unemployment rate increasing more than the total rate (A) and the increase of long 
duration unemployed workers (B).  
  The employment/unemployment data is obtained by inquiry based on Census (made every 
10 years). This mean that during the 1990’s the immigration from Latin America (Brazil), ex-
Portuguese Colonies and Eastern European countries were actually on the labour force supply but 
were not reflected into the Employment Inquiry. In 2006 the total labour force supply was 5 601.4 
thousands by the Inquiry and the immigrants were 437.126 thousands, 7.8% of the official value of 
the labour supply, Peixoto and Sabino (2009). As a consequence the actual unemployment rate was 
then lower than the official rate. Moreover, as Portugal is traditionally an emigration country this 
has also consequences on its unemployment rate. Portugal had three waves of emigration since 
1850: at the end of XIX century, the second and biggest one in the 1960’s and the third beginning in 
2002, Pereira (2001). The European Union with the freedom of people circulation has created a 
problem for migration statistics in Portugal. Based on Pereira (2010) calculations the emigration 
was 108388 and 101595 in 2007 and 2008, respectively and  from 2002 to 2008 the total value was 
542 808. The present wave differentiates from the two previous waves by the higher education level 
of the new Portuguese emigrants, what represents an effective brain drain Pereira and Lains (2010). 
If at the end of 2010 we count these emigrants since 2002 as unemployed searching an employment, 
the unemployment rate 11.1% is underevaluated, it ascends to 18.9%,  instead. The emigration 
phenomenon is known in Portugal as an “exhaust valve”, as is confirmed by this calculation. The 
unemployment  rate  can  be  a  bad  indicator  of  the  output  gap  as  well  as  a  bad  social  welfare 
indicator. We can conclude that the sluggish growth of the Portuguese economy has terrible effects 
in terms of unemployment. 
 
8. Bad Governance: the problem of off-budgeting practice matters 
  Voters may not understand the significance of many forms of off-budget expenditures but 
not capital markets. For example, Amaral (2011) has stressed  the inexistence of specific laws for 
public foundations. The government does not know the exact number of these institutions but they 
are  dependent of  public funds, as  indeed  private foundations. The  XIII and XIV constitutional 
government  of  António  Guterres  (1995-2002)  created  many  institutes  with  financial  and 
administrative  autonomy  with  the  aim  of  making  more  efficient  public  decisions  fleeing  the 
constraints of state bureaucracy. Some years after a really parallel state structure were in place. A 
part of their receipts is off-budget and their liabilities are not aggregated in the general government   15 
accounts.  The  debts  of  public  and  semi  public  firms  created  by  central  and  local  public 
administrations are guaranteed by the state but are not aggregated at the national public debt. The 
accumulated debt of non-financial firms owned by the state at the end of 2009 was 24.3% of the 
GDP, and in 2010 it is approximately 26%, Pereira (2010).  
In the last years, public-private partnerships at the level of road and rail infrastructure and 
also hospital buildings and the associated production of health services became a very controversial 
subject.  PPPs  are  an  alternative  to  traditional  public  investment;  they  allow  to  keep  these 
expenditures off-budget and to postpone the payment to the PPP operator in a yearly basis, Turrini 
(2004). This practice can hide inefficient projects and future commitments that are kept aside from 
the voters. Some of these contracts were renegotiated but always with more charges incurred by the 
State. Based on 2009 as reference year (Finanças (2010)), Table 12. shows the future costs from 
PPP. As we can see these costs represent with reference to 2010 1% by year of GDP.  From 2011 to 
2030 the total cost will be 20.9% of 2010 GDP, which is a huge amount of expenditures. The report 
for 2010 (Finanças (2011)) doesn’t publish the future costs of PPP. 
 
 
Table 11. PPP future costs in % of GDP (2010) 
5 Years Period  % GDP 2010 
2011-15    5.1 
2016-20    6.5 
2021-25    5.1 
2026-30    4.2 
Source: Finanças (2010) and authors’ calculation 
    
More important than public debt level is the absence of credible information about State 
liabilities, direct or indirect, like future liabilities associated to PPP expenditures already discussed 
that endangers capital markets confidence on Portuguese economy. 
  And finally we want to stress recent opportunist policies in a context of fiscal consolidation. 
The dates of recognition of an excessive deficit and for abrogating that decision were: 2002-04, 
2005-08  and  2009-?  (see  for  Portugal  EC  (22.6.2005),  EC  (2005),  EC  (7.10.2009)  and  EC 
(11.11.2009). For  all the excessive deficit  processes: EC (2011)).  In 2008,  using the  data then 
recognized by Portugal and Eurostat, Portugal exit an excessive deficit situation by implementing 
rigorous control of public expenditures and receipts. Political measures such as TVA reduction 
from 21% to 20%  (30
th May  2008)  and public sector  wages increase  of 2.9% in 2009 due  to 
elections to the Portuguese parliament, European Parliament and local governments were important 
signs that fiscal consolidation was no more a Government priority.    




  We  have  portrayed  Portuguese  economy  tracing  a  general  picture  whose  main 
characteristics are a situation diagnosed as a kind of Dutch disease since the second half of the 
1990’s, with a systematically decrease of its savings and suffering from the impact of globalization 
and loss of external competitiveness followed from a stagnated output since 2002  
We  have  also  concluded  that  the  output  gap  and  the  unemployment  rate  have  to  be  
interpreted  carefully.  A  new  output  trend  was  calculated  in  order  to  correct  the  recent  actual 
Portuguese sluggish growth. The  third vague of emigration has reduced the actual labour supply 
value resulting in the decrease of the unemployment rate.  Besides that high unemployment rates 
express a situation of apartheid in the labour market and low skills of older workers.    16 
A sluggish growth means less budget receipts and the government reaction to this was the 
development of an off-budget practice and also the creation of public firms to hide the increased 
disequilibrium  between  expenditures  and  receipts.  The  development  of  a  parallel  government 
structure, with the creation of public firms at the central and local governments, to employ party 
elements and pay them out of public administration salaries has also contribute to a real problem of 
lack  of  transparency  and  accountability.  Why  would  international  financial  markets  and  rating 
agencies ignore this situation and theses facts?  
  The Portuguese problems will be solved only with output growth. The simpler rule for inter-
temporal budget constraint states that debt can only be sustainable if real output growth is greater 
than the real interest rate. With an interest rate of 5.1 (more or less the average of the financial aid 
to the Portuguese economy), output has to grow at a minimum of 3%. This is the real challenge for 
the Portuguese economy. 
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